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Thispaper constitutes a chorough revision of an earlier attempt
to analyze the data collected by the Northeast Brazil Hou.ehold
Pilot Survey, RPO 299, carried out in 1974 by the Department of
Agriculture and Supply of the Sucerintendency for the Development
of the Northeast (DA.i.-SUDENE) in cooperation with the Population
and Human Resources Division of the Development Economics Deprr€nt
and with the Development Research Center of the World Bank. The
data supplied by the above institutions, the financial support
provided by the Ford Foundation and the opportunity to perform
this work at the National Bureau of Economic Research-West are
gratefully acknowledged.
Iam tharfu1lforcomments elicited by the presentation of earlier versions of this research at the Ford Foundation'sSymposium on
Populationin Rio do Janeiro, June 1976, andattwo seminars at Stanford:the Labor Seminarin October 1976 and the Agriculture andEconomic Development Seminar in January 1977. My greatest
debt of gratitude is to Robert J. Willis, for acquaintingme with
the current literature on fertility in Third World countries and
for discussing this work with me at successive, though not
necessarily prcgicsive ,stages of its execution. The inadequacies
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1.Introduction
Latin America is known for its high rate of population
growthand for the very high fertility rate of its rural. population.
The decline in Latin American fertility with urbanization and
economic growth has been attributed to many causes, both economic
and non—economic)- it is usually argued that new incentives for
fertility control are associated with these declines, countering
what is called a "traditional", "lethargic", "fatalistic" and
otherwise irrational mentality which favors large families in
2 Third World countries..
In this paper it isproposedthat high rural fertility
inLatin America is a deliberate andrational adjustment to the
conditionsof agricultural production that prevail in many areas
ofthe continent. The main finding is thatsharetenancy, the
predominantform of organization of production in the sparsely
populated central regions of the Northeast, and a common institution
in much of Latin America,3 contains a set of powerful fertility
inducementswhich are lost when households face a wage-labor
situationin agriculture or in cities. Thus, the rapid decline of
ruralfertility inthe past decade in Latin America4 may be due,in
part,tothe general demise of sharetenancyand its replacement by
sub-familyfarms (minifundios) dependent on wage labor5. These
broadimplications are discussed in thefinal section of the paper.
1Frank W. Oechli and DudleyKirk, "Modernization and the
Demographic Transition in Latin America and the Caribbean
Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol 23, April 1975,
pp 391—419.
2Frank W. Notestein, "Population: rheLong View", in Theodore
W. Schultz, ed., Food for the World, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1945, pp-57.
3lnternatj.onaj. Labor Office, The LandlessFarmer in Latin America,
Studies and Reports, New Series, N9 47, Geneva, 1957.
4Barry Edmonstort, Urban and RuralFertility Changes in Latin
America,The Influence of Migration and Urbanization in Brazil, ColombiaandMexico, Interdisciplinary Program for Population Analysis—ICP—SmithsonianInstitution, September 1975.
5Alain de Janvry,Carlos Bertito andEfraim Franco, Rural Development inLatin America: Three Projects Observed,Departmeof
Agricultural Economics, University of California,Berkeley, 1977, Part I (forthcomnu.ng).
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Theempirical evidence is drawn from one of the most
backward and highest fertility areas of Latin America: .the Brazilian
Northeast.The ecological and economic environment of poor rural
households in that region is described and their fertility and
economic behavior is presented in a series of life—cycle profiles
calculated from a small sample gathered in two representative sub-
regions.
2. Background
Over thirty million people live in the Brazilian Northeast,
alarge geographical area (1,600,00 square kilometers), notorious
for the occurrence of sporadic droughts which destroy agricultural
production6 and cause masses of the ruralpopulation to migrate to
cities, to more humid rural areas within the Northeast itself, or
to other regions of Brazil. By expelling people in this fashion,
thedrought-pronecentral areas of the Northeast have contributed
heavily to Brazilian urban population growth problems, while
maintaining a moderate rate of increase within their own confines.7
Steadily drained of prime workers, those who are left behind
constitute the poorest segment of the Brazilian population. In 1974,
the year to which this study refers, Northeastern ruralper capita
income was U.S.$ 200, as compared to the nationalaverage of
U.S.$ 800. It is also a population of above average fertility, with
child-woman ratios roughly 30% above the nationalaverage in 1970.8
6Analysis of annual rainfall statistics since 1930 inthe State
of Rio Grande do Norte shows that critical droughtyears
(annual rainfall less than 250 m.m.) that cause severecrop
losses have approximately 20% probability of occurrence: i.e.,
one year in five. Report N9 921-BR, Northeast Brazil Rio
Grande do Norte Development Project, R DD—ARDD-WB, November 11,
1975, Annex 1 p. 2.
7For example, in Rio Grande doNorte, the drought—prone state
covered in the sample analyzed in this paper, the average annual
rate of rural population growth was only 1.2%, while the urban
rate was 5.3% in the same state from 1960 to 1970, according
to the National Demographic Censuses.
8Based on data.presentedby Barry Edmonston and Carl R. Zulauf,
"Data for Analyzing Rural-Urban Fertility Levels in Brazil,
Colombia and Mexico", Food Research Institute, Stanford
University, September 1975, Table 4, p. 16.
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Therural household survey described below is evenly
divided between an out-migration region -theSertio do Seridô
region of the state of Rio Grande do Norte -andan in-migration
region in the State of Maranhäo. The Rio Grandedo Norte part of
the sample (85 households), was collected in Caicô and Flornia,
two "townships" (municipios) ,inthe hot semi-arid area of the
centralNortheastern region called thesertão (400—600 m.m. of
rainfallperyear during 4-6 months and periodic drought; mean
yearly temperatures ranging from 239 C. to 279 C.) .Theregion
consists of large, flat, rocky stretches interrupted by abrupt
mesas and interspersed by fertile valleys where the land is
cultivated.Population density is very low(2-24 inhabitants
persquare kilometer) ,butthetownsare lively and peopled by a
population well rooted in distinctivecustoms, proud and even
rowdy,where brawls and shoot-outs are not uncommon. Perennial
cotton and cattle are the main cash—earning economic activities.
Beans and corn are interplanted with first—year cotton for
subsistance. As would be expected under conditions of risky
agriculture, large farms (fazendas) rely on sharing labor contracts
rather than wage or fixed rent agreements.1° Sharing occurs both
in the form of share—tenancy (parceiros)11 and in the form of
9SUDENE—DAA, Pesguisa do Tarnanho Tpico da Unidade de Produçäo
gicola do Nordeste: Reiatôrio da Fase I(Versao Preliminar),
Recife, December 1975, p. 90.
10Much of the mushrooming literature onsharecropping links this
formof contractual labor. arrangement with risk-sharingbetween
landlordand agricultural worker, under conditions of output
uncertainty.See, for example: S.N.S. Cheurig, "Transactions
Costs, Risk Aversion and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements',
Journal of Law and Economics, April 1969, pp. 23-42; D.M.G.
Newbery, "The Choice of Rental Contract in Peasant Agriculture",
Chapter 5 of Agriculture in Development Theory, L. Reynolds
(ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press; and also D.M.G.
Newberry, Risk Sharing, Sharecropping and Uncertain Labor
Markets, IMSS Technical Report N9 202, April 1976, Stanford;
T.D. Reid, "Sharecropping As an Understandable Market Response:
The Post-Bellum South", The Journal of Economic History,vol. 33
n9 1, March 1973, pp. 106—130.
Share—tenants (pçeiros) exercisesome entrepreneurial judgment
and relative autonomy over a given, definite plot of land.
Sharecroppers (moradores)exercise no management skills, and do
not have a definite plot of land. They receive a share of the
output they harvest, asa wagepayment in kind. Thus share-
croppersare amix of share-tenants and money wage workers.
Giventhe absense of fixed rent contracts in the sample, both
sharecroppersand share—tenants will be called, sirnply,'tenants",
in order to simplify the exposition.$ECn1TAA 01 M.ANIJAM(NT0 0* PRCI0NCI* 0* 1PIUCA
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sharecropping(moradores). Pure wage-labor is practically
nonexistent. 12
In the Maranhäo part of the sample (80 households), the
surveyed township -Moncão-contrastsstrikingly with the Serid.
Itis apre-amazonic region to the west of Rio Grande do Norte,
alsowith low population density (3-24 inhabitants per square
kilometer), but heavier rainfall (600—2,000 m.m. per year over a
4—6month period), flat plains, and a shallow topsoil that is
easily eroded if the forest is removed. A nomadic population of
squatters (posseiros)practices slash and burn agriculture on the
forest fringe. Corn, beans and manioc are grown for subsistence
and rice is sold to marketing intermediaries who transport and
resell it in urban markets. Extraction of babacu and carnaCiba
nuts are the main cash earning alternatives13 to rice. Rapid soil
erosion in the space of a. few years, plus inability to control the
onrush of weeds, push the farmer ever farther into the forest,
followed steadily by cattle ranchers whose herds prevent the return
of the former vegetation.14
Given their surrounding ecological environments, households
in both surveyed regions face periodic years of financial stress,
either because of the need to move to another location along the
forest fringe or because of a drought in the sertão. Since they.
have rarely been able to save enough to finance the added
expenditures, they frequently fall into debt during these critical
years. However, unless exceptionally high yields occur during the
next inter—crisis years, farmers may not manage to save enough,
after paying off their debts, to survive the next drought or to
finance the next move without having to borrow again. Under fortunate
120n1y onepurewage laborer was found in the present sample.
131n fact, as it turned out,many of these farmers are renters,
not of land, but of nut treesThis form of contract was not
predicted by the questionnaire, and therefore was not
adequately recorded in the sample.
14P.L. Scandizzo, Land Distribution Tenancy Systems and Target
Populations in Northeast Brazil, Report Prepared for the
Special Economic Mission to Northeast Brazil, DRC—WB,
September 24, 1974, p. 4.3.4.
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circumstances,the occurrence in succession of a sufficient number
of good crops does allow some households to save enough to buy a
small sub-family plot (miniftindio) of their own, typically under
10 ha. in area.15 This is not an unmixed blessing, since small
landowners forfeit their claim to credit customarily extended by
land—lords and become more vulnerable than tenants to year—to—year
irregularities in output.16Moreover,the existence of labor
slackduring much of the year reduces the dependability of the wage
employment alternative when small landowners needs it most.
Consequently, small landowners sometimes give up their plots and
revert to tenancy in crisis years. There appears to be considerable
mobilityback andforth among small landowners, tenants and squatters
intheBrazilian Northeast. These three types of agricultural
laboraccount for approximately 60% of the northeastern labor force. 17
The remainder are mainly wage laborers and intermediate size owner-
operators.
The principil employer of this labor-force, whether on
a full or part-time basis, is a small group of landlords who own
most of thearable land and virtually monopolize access to water
reervoirsin the drought prone areas. Since landlords'
agricultural income is dependent on the production of cash crops,
their main problem is to elicit from the unrooted, roving and
dispersednortheastern population a sufficiently large and
sufficiently steady flow of labor devoted to cash crop production.
Anunique symbiotic solution to the securityneeds of
).andlessrural households andtcthe labor requirements of
landlordsin the Brazilian NOrtheast has beenthe emergence
15From 1960 to 1970, the number of minifundios in the Northeast
as a whole nearly doubled (873,124 to 1,503,280) while the
average area of a minifundio fell from 3.14 ha to 2.72 ha.
This reduction in the average size of the plot has occasioned
increasing part—time sharecropping or part—time wage work by
small 1ando•.'ners. See P.L. Scandjzzo, Land Distribution,...,
Table 1.2 p.3.
16Aw Johnson, Sharecroppers of the Serto: Economicsand
Dependence on a Brazilian Plantation,1971, Stanford University
Press, Stanford ,Californja, discusses the role of landlords
as creditors to their tenants in the Brazilian Northeast.
17Fundaçäo Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica(FIBGE)
Censo Agroecuirio de 1970, TotalBrasil,Table 12.
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ofa specific form of share-tenancy arrangement, quite different in
many respects from its counterparts inAsia18 or in post Civil—War
Southern United States.19 Landlords provide tenants with an elastic
supply of land, according to household size, food consumption credit,
and marketing services (for their cash—crop production as well as
fortheir consumption purchases) ,inreturn for a contractually
fixed share of their output and the right to be paid inkindfor
alldebts. This agreement protects the tenant household from the
extreme distress occasioned by severe droughts and cushions them
from the impact of milder climatic variations. Since the debt is
paid back at harvest time each year in terms of the cash crop, this
system increases the quantitity of that crop that the landlord takes
to market, above and beyond his own contractual share, in a form
similar to that of the crop—lien system of the South of the United
States in the post—slavery period.20
Aside from the sharing proportion, other features of the
Northeast Brazil sharing agreement are not explicitly contracted.
In particular, neither the labor obligations of the tenant, nor the
credit services of the landlord are formally stated. This
contrasts with the painstaking detail of share—tenancy contracts
elsewhere21; probably reflecting the fact that formal labor contracts
are basically unenforceable by absentee landlords and that informal
18Steven N.S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969.
19Roger Ransom and Pi.ch&rd Sutch, What was Freedom's Price?,
An Economic History of the Post Emancipation American South,
Berkeley and Riverside, California, 1977 (forthcoming)
20Crop—lien indebtedness occurs when farmers promise to pay back
their loans in kind, in terms of a portion of their future
harvest. This form of collateral on loans was also typical of
Post-Bellum sharecropping in Southern United States. See R.L.
Ransomand R. Sutch, "Debt Peonage in the Cotton South after
theCivil War", The AmericanEconomic Review,Vo. 62,N9 1,
March 1972, pp. 77-86; the critique by W.W. Brown and M. 0.
Reynolds, "Debt Peonage Re—examined", The Journal of Economic
History, Vol. 33, N9 4, December 1973, pp. 862—87l, and the
subsequentpaper by R. Ransom and R. Sutch, "The 'Lock—In'
Mechanismand Overproduction of Cotton in the Posthellum South',
Agricultural History, Vol. XLIX N9 2, April 1975, pp. 405—425.
21Joseph Reid Jr., Agricultural History, Vol 49, N9 2, April
1975, pp 426—440.
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credittransactions allow for interest rates typically well above
maximum legal rates. Instead of explicit contracts, therefore,
thecrop—lien system takes over as an expedient device for
controling andelicitingtenant labor. The fact that debt
repayment is subtracted from the tenant's share at harvest time
increaseshis chances of indebtedness for the following year,
unless he devotes more labor to the cash crop or a particularly
good yield happens to come his way. Otherwise, his consumption
needs may again overshoot his income andhewill incur in iurther
debt. Moreover, if another bad year occurs, or if another
dependent memberjoinsthehousehold, then the escape from
indebtedness during that year will necessarilyrequire much more labor
inputinto the cash crop. This will reallocate labor effortaway
fromfood production and may, in turn, boost food purchase
requirements,unless the total amountof labor effort by the
householdis increased.
Chronic indebtedness is an intrinsic feature of share—
tenancyin the Brazilian Northeast and elsewhere.22 Indeed,
given the uncertainty typical of the Northeastern ecoloay
indebtedness itself may be one of the principal motives of both
parties to the contract. It causes relatively high specialization
of tenant labor in cash-crop production, as well as relatively -
morelabor effort per household, thaninthe case of wage
laborers.23 Inthis paper it isproposed that anadditional
result of share—tenancy indebtedness is that tenants will desire
and achieve larger families than other rural households. The
arg'imentis presented in the next section.
22
See Sources in footnote ( 20 )above.
23Seevery interesting evidence to this effect in Maria Rita
Garcia Loureiro,Parceria e Capitaljsmo, Zahar, Riode Ja-
neiro, 1977.
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3.Fertility Decisions Among Small LandOwners and Share-Tenants
Fertilitybehavior, to the extent that it is deliberate,
reflects the satisfactions that parents expect to derive from their
childrenthroughout the remainder of their life—times. This
satisfaction may come from the children in andofthemselves,
or from the income that is expected of them.24This expected incorre,
in itsturn,may be prized as a boost to parents' incomes while
they are still economically active, here called a "labor motive"
24
Inthe first instance (children desired mostly for their
in sake),fertilitybehavior has merited alongand qrowiflq
literature,focused predominantely on developed countries,
GaryS. Becker," An Economic Analysisof Fertility"
inDemographic andEconomic Change in Developed Countries,
Universities —NationalBureau Committee for Economic
Research, Conference Series 11, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1960, pp. 209—231; Gary S. Becker and H. Gregg
Lewis, "On the Interaction Between the Quantity and Quality
of Children", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81, N9 2,
Part II, March/April, 1973, pp S279-S288; Robert J. Willis,
"A New Approach to the Economic Theory of Fertility
Behavior", •Journal of Political Economy, vol. 81, N 2,
Part II, March/April 1973, pp. S14-S64; and many others
who emphasize the cost of child—services i.e., of the
satisfaction derived from children themselves. Warren C.
Sanderson,The Interaction Between Aspirations andResources:
TheView of Easterlin andOther New Home Economists ,CP?.G
ResearchMemorandum N9 200, StanfordUniversity, has proposed
that'the above group of fertility analysts are approximating
a large rival group, led by Richard A. Easterlin. "On
TheRelations of Economic Factors to Recent and Projected
Fertility Changes", Demography, Vol. 3, 1966, pp 131—151;
Richard A. Easterlin, "An Economic Framework for Fertility
Analysis", Studies in Family Planning, Vol 6, N9 3, March
1975, pp 54—63, and several others, who emphasize parental
mobility aspirations, status and other sociological variables
in explaining fertility behavior. This literature has been
surveyed by Warren E. Sanderson in Economic Theories of
Fertility; What doTheyExplain? NBER working paper series
N9 36,March1974andby Harvey Leibenstein, "AnInterpretation
of the Economic Theory of Fertility: Promising Path or Blind
Alley?", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 12, N9 2,
June 1974, pp 457—479.
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forfertility
25or as a hoped-for meansofsupport during
parents'old age,here called a "pension motive" for fertility
26
In addition, given the conditions that prevail in the Brazilian
Northeast, emergency support is required in the occurrence of
crisis years, whether due to drought or travel.27
There are many controversies regarding whether the net
present value of children's future income contributions is positive
or negative at their time of birth, over the difference in social
versus private rates of discount concerning fertility decisions25
most stimulating discussion on the "labor motive" is
contained in John C. Caldwell, Towards a Restatement of
Demographic Transition Theory; An Investigation of Conditions
Before and at the Onset of Fertility Decline Employing
Primarily African Experience and Data, February 1976, (rnimeo).
In spite of an excessively early cut—off age (children are
assumedto leave home when they are19years old), some
empiricalevidence on net positive "labor—benefits" from
children in the Philipines, Java and Nepal are presented by
Peter H.Lindert,Child Costs and Economic Development, paper
presented at the Universities -NBERConference on Population
and Economic Change in Less Developed Countries, September-
October, 1976.
26Philip A. Neher, Peasants, Procreation and Pensions' ,The
AmericanEconomic Review, Vol 61, Nc 3, part1,Junel97l
pp 380-389 andDov Chrnichovsky, Fertility Behavior in
UnderdevelopedCountries; An Investment Approach,Ph.D.
Dissertation,City University of New York, 1975, both divide
parental life-times into only two periods (Neher's third
period is posthumous). This forces pension—benefits to
overpowerlabor-ber.efits,which come in between
procreation and dependency.
27Thisfourth motive was frequently rntioned by respondents
inthe survey analysed below. But since it was not predicted
inthe coding scheme, it was not recorded. The other three motives
were first discriminated by Harvey Leibenstein in Economic
Backwardness and Economic Growth, John Wiley, New York, 1957,
p.161.
28Seethesurveyon this branch of the fertility literature
byWarrenC.Robinson and David E. Horlacher, "Population
Growthand Economic Welfare', Reports on Population and
FamilyPlanning,N9 6,February1971, pp 1-9.
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andover the extent to which fertility behavior is consciously
determined.29 If it were established that parents in Northeastern
Brazil do receive a net positive flow of income from their
children, that alternative means of ensuring themselves of future
income are available to them, and finally, that there are positive
costs to child—rearing as well as to procuring durable income—
yielding assets, then itwouldbe valid to examine whether the
fertilityof those parents may be consciously influenced by the
relative costs of children versus alternative sources of future
income. In order to empirically test such a hypothesis, however,
onemust first translate the abstract economic concepts of assets
andcosts, into their concrete manifestations in the specific
Northeastern context.
The main alternative to children as a source of future
incomein the rural areas of Northeast Brazil is land. Cattle
are very risky, since they perish in a severe drought. Cooperatives
and banks are unreachable, since they do not extend credit to
those who have no collateral. Investments in formal schooling are
somewhatpointless in an economy with skill requirements learned
through work experience, not in the traditional class rooms of
smallrural communities. Out-migration holds the nebulous
promise of higher paying urban jobs, but also the expectation of
long uncomfortable travel on crowded buses to places where cash
is needed for every transaction, plus an indefinite period of
unemployedadjustment to foreign surroundings. Investment in the
future, therefore, narrows down to investment in children or in
land. Land provides income even to very small land'wners, who
frequently sharcrop Out their miniscule plots.30 Old people who
atleast own their land are therefore assured of "retirement"
incomeeven if there are no children to support them.
29Richard A. Easterlin, Robert A. Pollak and Michael L. Wachter,
Toward a More General Economic Model of Fertility Determination:
Endogenous Preferences arid Natural Fertility, paper presented
for the Universities -NBEP.Conference on Economic and
DemographicChange in Less Developed Countries, Philadelphia,
September-October 1976, propose a typology of "pre—modern",
"intermediate" and "wholy modern" populations according to
thedegree of conscious deliberateness in their fertility
behavior.
30Gary P. Kutcher and Pasquale L. Scandizzo, LandTenure,
Employment andFarm Performance in RioGrande do Norte, The
WorldBank, Development Research Center, Development Planning
Division, Working Paper N9RPO:273/XVII/l,Table 4,p.6.
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Thecost of land, however, is money, that scarce resource
in an economy with a strong subsistance component, where all the
principaltransactions are effected in kind. Moreover, large land-
lords are reluctant to sell small plots of land and, when they do
so, restrict such sales to low productivity plots far from water
reservoirs. This has caused the progressive partitioning of
already small plots into even smaller units over time,asmentioned
previously,unti'they are no longer sufficient to support a
householdwithout the exertion of further labor elsewhere. Thus,
imperfectionsin the land markethave progressively inqreased the
costof acquiring land in the rural northeast.
The cost of children,on theotherhand, isnot measured
incash, but interms of the time and goods devoted to them by
the family. Ina labor-slack economy,the time-cost of children
is quite low31and the goods-costprobablypredominantes. Among
the goods consumed by children, the largest component in near
subsistence circumstances is food.32 In fact, child mortality
is critically high during the weaning ages, 2-3 years, when
children become most vulnerable to food shortages.33
31The time-cost of children, especially that of the mother, is
a critical variable in deliberate—controled fertility models
such as those cited in the firstpartof footnote ( 24
above. But the availability of grandparents andpre—adolescents
to take care of young children, andthelack of employment
alternatives for these types of household members, reduces
the time-intensity of child-rearing for the household as a whole.
32Consumption of non-food items is low, not only for children
butfor every household member. Bare, unflored huts,
furnitureless except for hammocs, a fire—wood stove and,
perhaps, one or two hurriedly procured stools greet the
outsider; that is all. Foodisthe main consumption
item and fathers' often joke about the food—cost ofyoung
children by answering that their main "contribution" to the
householdis eating:




33Ruy Laurenti, "Alauns Aspectos da Mortalidade de Crianças r4eno
res de 5 Anos emTrés Areas Brasileiras", Crescimento Fooulaci—
onal(Histôrico e Atual) e Comoonentes do Crescimento
dade e Migraçoes) ,CodernosCERAP N9 l6,Sao Paulo, 1973, pp.
75—92 finds tRat malnutrition is responsible for 70% to 80
of child-deaths between 1 and4 yeursof ageinsurveyed
rural communities in Brazil.
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Thecost of food in those surroundings, in its turn, has
three components. The first is the land and labor cost of food
production by the household itself, there being no capital to speak
of. The second is the retail margin of food purchases. The third
is the interest-rate charged by the creditor who finances inter-
harvest food consumption by deficit households.
Thefirst Cost, the production cost of food, can be
expected to be higher, and to rise more with growing family size,
among small landowners than because of the incidence of diminishing
returns in minifundos. This problem is circumventedamong tenants,
however, is circumvented by landlords' practice of alloting land
according to their family size. The second cost, the interest cost
of food, is also much higher for small landowners, who have only
local usurers to finance their consumption, than for share-tenants
who have easy access to the credit extended by their landlords.
The third cost, the retail cost of food, is probably about thesame
for all houselolds,. or approximately so. Thus, the foodcost of
children, n that environment, should be lower for share—tenants
than for small land owners.
These considerations lead to the prediction that share-
tenants would want andhavemore children than other rural residents
for two reasons. First, because the cost of acquiring child-
substitutes (maiply land) is relatively high for them and secondly,
because the cost of acquiring children (mainly consumer credit) is
relatively low for share—tenants compared to other agricultural
households. One would, in fact, expect tenants to be less conscious
of the costs of child rearing and more aware of the beaefits to be
derived from children.Therefore, they may engage in practices which
increasetheir fertility and, more importantly, these practicesmay
even be consciously motivated towards high fertility. Given the
commonethnic, regional, cultural, economic background of all these
ruralhouseholds;given the relative mobility between small land
ownersandof share tenants; given their commoncontact with reiativs
who have undertaken the drastic out-migration venture and who have
therebyadopted lower urban fertility patterns, then both high and
low fertility may be the outcome of deliberate decisions, not of
ritualpracticesperformed with no fertility outcome in mind.
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Thishypothesis differs both from those advanced by
controled fertility advocates as well as by natural fertility
advocates for Third World countries.34 It proposes that a natural
fertility outcomemay be the result of adeliberate but truncated
ef fort to obtain a more than the feasible number of births. This
desire for high fertility may be economically motivated and
analysableaccording to a choice-theoretic decision model that
would take into account the specific costs and benefits associated
with children, such as those mentioned briefly in the above
paragraphs.
The following section presents evidence of high desired
fertilityamong share tenants andlow desired fertility among
smallland owners drwn from a small sample taken in Northeastern
Brazil.Evidence of different relative costs andbenefits
associatedwith children among different tenure classes are also
presented at the end of the section.
4. Some Life-Cycle Patterns of Rural Household Behavior in
Northeast Brazil
Theoriginal objective of the small household survey
described in this section had been to prepare for a subsequent
andlarger survey on the fertility and household behavior of small
farmers in Northeastern Brazil.35 The sequel was never carried
out,however, and the experimental questionnaires became the only
comprehensive source of information on rural household behavior
to emerge from .he project.
34See footnotes (24,25 and 29) aboe.
35Project RPO 273 of the SUDENE/DRC survey carried out in
1973.
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Problemsconcerning truncation, the unrepresentative
nature of the sample inconsistencies amonglocalitiessurveyed
andmany others have been discussed inseveral World Sank
reports36 and need not be enumeratedhere. In all, considering
the flood conditions faced that year by theinterviewers, results
have turned out to be surprisingly consistent withstate and
regional figures.37 The sample is very small: consistenteconomic
and demographic information was obtained forOnly 165 households in all. 38
36See T. King, D.Chernichovsky andR. Moran, "Economic Aspects ofHousehold Fertility Behavior andLabor Supply,Phase I Report", Population andHuman Resources Division,Development
Economics Departrnnt, Washington, IBRD, June 1976; C.Cavalcan
ti, "Pesquisa sobre a Familia Rural: Sugestöespara urn projeto depesquisa" ("Survey on the Northeastern Rural Household:
Suggestionsfor a Research Project")
,Recife,Instituto Joa-
quim Nabuco, July 1975; A.L. Ozorio de Almeida, "Reporton
the Northeastern Brazil Rural HouseholdSurvey Pilot Project",
Rio de Janeiro, INPES, July 1974.
37it is perhapssurprising that mean values for key demographic
variables do not deviate substantially from the overall
pattern for the Brazilian Northeast. However,according to R. Moran,"Socioeconomic Characteristics of Sampled Househo.lds: Comparisons with Northeast andCountry-wideSamples from Official Brazilian Surveys", unpublished,PHRD-DED—WB, working age women do appear to be somewhat overrepresr.ted, female
literacy is higher andfertilityand mortality rates are somewhat lower thanintheNortheastas a whole, especially among the younger women in the sample:
Brazilian Pilot
Northeast Survey
Working age proportion (%) 40 60
Female literacy (%) 50 43
Average Live Births perWoman 6.7 6 ChildSurvival Ratio (%) 72 66 Mean Household Size 6.7 7.6
Proportion of non—nuclear
fai1y_jenthers(%) 7 16
38Thirteertquestionnaires, corresponding to households numbered
023, 047, 052, 053, 054, 056, 094, 111, 143, 153, 156 and157,
were removed from the sample due to data omissions critical
to the analysis. Differences in ieans computed
here and in other papers using the same data shouldbe
attributed to different exclusion criteria. See, forexample,
Dov Chernichovsky, "Some Socioeconomic Aspects ofFertility
Behavior in Northeast Brazil, "PHRD—DED-WB, November 1976.
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Becauseof the many known shortcomings of the data base,
it is used in this paper as illustrative support for empirical
propositions, rather thanasa vehicle for hypothesis testing. The
demographicand economiclife cycle patterns preéented will hopefully
bethought-provoking for data-starved students of rural household
behavior in the Third World. In addition, some of the findings may
prove insightful for those interested in 19th century demographic
transitions among countries which experienced a sharecropping stage
between slavery, or serfdom, arid free wage rural labor.39
This section describes several salient features of life—
cycle household behavior among tenants, small landowners and
squatters living in the environs of two townships in the State of
Rio Grande do Norte -Caicôand Florânia- and one township in the
State of Marariho-Moncão-inthe Brazilian Northeast. As is
shown below, tenants are found to have outstandingly high fertility
levels compared to the other population groups and even compared
to natural fertility populations in other countries. Fertility
differentials within the sample appear to be consistent with
differences in childrents contributions to household income
throughout the life cycle in each sample subgroup, as well as
with mothers' and fathers' stated perceptions of the relative costs
and benefits of child rearing. All tables referred to in the text
are in the appendix.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample among age—
location—tenure cells. The disadvantage of the small sample is
evident by the small number df observations in each cell and by the
number of empty cells. Ten—year age brackets would have eliminated
empty cells, but they would also have entailed a loss of comparability
between the fertility profiles shown here and those presented by
otherauthors.
39me absence of pure wage laborers inthis sarile is noteworthy,
giventhe rapid demise of tenancy in the South of the country
and 3.ts substitution by wage contracts. It is said that the
switchto wage labor in the South is caused by fear of tenants'
claims to land farmed by them over a certain number of years,
Consonant with recent rural labor legislation. If so, this
threat had not yet been perceived by the landlords in the
Serido in 1974.
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Thelargest tenure class in the present sample is
composed of squatters; the smallest comprises small landowners.
Only three interviewed mothers were under twenty years of age;
thirty-eight (the largest age contingent) were over fifty. This
heavy representation of relatively older women is somewhat atypical
of the region,40 but turns Out to be quite fortunate for the
purpose of calculating retrospective fertility schedules, shown
in the next table.
Table 2 presents estimated retrospective fertility
profiles for the surviving children of all, women in the sample.41
The estimate, however, is heavily influenced bythepast fertility
experience of olderwomenand may not be representative of the
fertilitybehaviorofwomencurrently belonging to each age
42 bracket.
The first impression gained fromTable 2 isthat
completedsurviving family size is rather moderate: 5.7 children
forthe sample as a whole: 5.76 in Caicd, 6.91in Floränia and
5.10 in Monco. Tenants have slightly larger families than small
landowners, who, in turn, have more live children than squatters.
It is knownthatcouples who control their fertility
tend to first allow for a given desired number of births and to
attemptprevention thereafter. This leads to profiles rather
similar in slopeto natural fertility profiles (i.e., uncontrolled
births) in the early stages of the life cycle, and to flatter profiles
40R.Moran,"Socioeconomic Characteristics.. ."Table4.2,p.4.4
41Childrenalive were allocated to appropriate age intervals
according to their own and their mothers' ages. Averages
were then calculated, based on the number of women who had
achieved a given age interval. The number of observations
in each column consequently decreases with advancing age:
both young and Old women are represented in the early age
brackets, but only older women are represented in the latter
agebrackets.
420nepossible test for the significance of possible differences
betweenyoungerand oldercohortswithin each age bracket,
precluded due to the time constraints on this paper, would be
to regress observed fertility on (0, 1) dummies for women
under, and over,30 years ofage.
9
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inlater years. One possible test for the presence of active
birth control in a given population, therefore, is the degree to
which fertility profiles flatten out relative to the maximum
births attainable (natural fertility) .Inorder to better interpret
the figures presented in Table 1, its first four rows are graphed
in Figure 1 and compared to Henry's average natural fertility
profile.43
All profiles in Figure 1 lie well below the natural
fertility case (H), except for children born to Floränia woman
when they were 20to 25 years old. The Flornia schedule (F) is so
much higher than the schedules for Caicô and Moncão (C and M) that
one suspects that differences in subsample composition may be at
play. Accordingly, after regrouping the sample according to tenure
classes in Figure 2, one sees that tenants have uniformly higher
child survival rates; small landowners and squatters cross in the
30 to 35 age bracket.
The fact that these profiles lie everywhere below Henry's
may either indicate widespread birth control —anunlikely
supposition for the Brazilian Northeast -orhigher child mortality
than in the control group. In order to correct for child mortality,
estimated age-specific child death rates44 were added to the
surviving birth rates, yielding an estimate of age—specific total
live births. The results are presented in Table3and Figure 3.
43LouisHenry,"Some Data on Natural Fertility", Eugenics
Quarter,Vol. 8, N9 2, pp. 81-91, Tablep. 84.
approximationto age—specific child mortality rates was
calculatedin the following way. Totaldeaths reported by
womenineachage group were divided by duration ofmarriage and then regrouped into five-year Intervals. These fractions
were added in succession, with increasing woman's age. Thus,
contraryto the case of survivingbirths, thechilddeaths
estimatedare more heavily weighted by the child mortality
experience of younger women. This approximation was made
necessary because information regarding age at death was not
adequatelycoded for children who were more than one year old
when they died.
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Eventhough appropriate confidence intervals have not yet been
estimatedfor the profiles in Figure 3, their appearance is
suggestive of several important implications. First, fertility
among tenants is outstandingly high by any standard.45 Secondly,
thefertility profile for small landowners is apparently quite
similar to the naturalfertility case (H); i.e., small landowners
donot seem to control fertility either. According to the estimated
profiles, squatters are the group most likely to be excercising
someformofcontrol,though they need not beconscious of doing
so.Their nomadic life—style in itself may cause frequent
separation among spouses andotherunintended restraints to the
number of births per woman.
Table 4showsthepercentageof each tenure group -
tenants,small landowners, others (squatters plus part—time share-
croppers) —whojustified their family size preference in terms of
cost, in terms of benefits,or in terms of other considerations
regarding children. Health costs are taken to be aresponse that
either explicitly refers to the physical health strains of child
bearing or that refers to "psychic cbsts" such as pain, fear of
childbirth etc. Economic costs occur when the interviewer says
45
Giventhe method bywhichTables 2 and 3 were calculated,
one should bear in mindthe possibilitythat the slopes of
the profiles will be overestimated if:
i) presently older women had,in the past, relatively
moresurviving children than youngerwomen within
each age bracket; or, alternatively,
ii)presentlyyounger women had,in the past, more child
deaths thanolder women withineach age bracket.
Neither appear to be the case in this sample or in other
Brazilian rural, regions. The city of So Paulo, in the
South of the country does seem to have very high infant
mortality rates for teen—age mothers compared to older
mothers,but this seems to be related to specifically
urbanproblems. See Dr. Ruy de Laurenti, "Alguns Aspec-
tog...", Table 7, p. 88.
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heor she is too poor to have a large family. Labor benefits are
recorded if the respondents say they want children for their labor
("para trabaihar"). Pension benefits refer to the expressed wish
for security in old age. "Enjoyment" refers to interviewees who
wantedmany children because "its nice to have them". Fatalistic
allusions to God's will and all other responses are added together
in the "Others" column.
The importance of Table 4 is that fathers and mothers
wereinterviewed separately, by male and female enumerators,
respectively. This led to ahigh incidence of omissions for
fathers,apparently due to the male interviewers' forgetfulness,
and possiblehidden distaste about such "women'squestions".
Nonetheless, Table 4presentsvaluable evidence of different views
concerning children by mothers and fathers, as we•ll as systematic
tendencies among tenure classes.
The majority of respondents have clear conceptions
of thecostsor benefits associatedwith having dildren.
It is noteworthy that the pension motive is almost
entirelyabsent and, when cited, concerned only women. Tenant )
parentsrefer to benefits more than three tines as frequently aa
any other. Tenantfathers mostlywant children's labor, while
tenant mothers frequently say they just like to have children.
Tenants perceive child cost much less frequently than small
landowners or squatters do. The economiccosts ofchildrenare
perceivedmost frequently by squatter mothers. The health costs
ofchild bearing are most emphasized by small landowner mothers.
Nontenant fathers seem to be rather indifferent to children.
These responses areinaccordance with the fertility
profiles seen above. Tenants apparently have more children
because they want morechildrenthandosmall landowners or
squatters.Moreover, tenants apparently expect to benefit more
from child labor andtohave fewer economic constraints to child
rearing than nontenants.
'Ifexpectationsare formed bysurrounding
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example46,then Tables 5-8 suggest that tenants indeed are
realistic in counting more on their children's contribution
to household labor than do other tenure classes. Older tenant
families have more resident children (Table 5) and, consequently,
moreworkers (Table 6) than theother twogroups. In addition,
tenant children put in longer hours than the children of the
others (Table 7) and contribute proportionately more to household
income (Table 8).
The poor showing in Table 4 of the "pension motive" for
wanting children is also justified by prevailing practices. In
economies characterized by a large proportion of subsistence
consumption (Table 9) ,inter-householdremittances are too
cumbersome and inter-generational income transfers in kind are
effected primarily within the household. Accordingly (Table 10),
gifts, pensions and other forms of income not produced by house-
hold members are a small percentage of total family income. They
appear to be primarily a matter of local institutional availability
(e.g. of rural workers' unions,) rather than a matter of age or
tenure. No significant life cycle pattern in the relative ages
of non—nuclear family members was found, even though a vaguely
"U" shaped pattern discerned in Table 10 may indicate that young
wives frequently live in households where there are older
pensioners.
Thepreceding set oftables was intended to be illustrative
ofthe economiccontributions of children to thedistinct groups
ofparentsinterviewed in the sample. However, as noted earlier,
46The formation ofexpectations about children is a complicated
matter that depends on mobility aspirations,former experiences, thechoice ofpeer group and many other factors frequently discussed in the literature on fertility. Inthe tJ.S.,adolescent experience may be crucial in setting up theaspirations of future parents, for themselves and/or fortheir children thereby influencing their subsequent fertility behavior. Rural-urban migrants in Latin lunerica, on theother hand ususally move before marrying and may thenexperience neighborhood effects and copy the fertilitybehavioursurrouii.ig them in urban areas.
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inpresenting Table 4, parents explain desired family size not
only with regard to expected benefits from children, but also
from the point of view of expected costs. The fact that tenants
dc—emphasize child costs, while small landowners and squatters
stress them, suggests that children may be "cheaper" for tenants
thanfornontenants.
Asdiscussed in section 3above,the main child—cost
toparents,in the bare subsistance conditions of rural areas in
the Brazilian Northeast,is the cost of food. Food, in its turn,
may be relatively cheaper for sharetenants —dueto the
availability ofconsumerloans extended by landlords —thanfor
others, whose ties to the local "credit-worthy" elite are weaker.
Accordingly,'cheaper"children for tenants would imply that they
borrow more for food consumption than do. others. This expectation
is supported in Tables 11 and 12.
Table 11 shows a strikingly different pattern of
indebtedness between tenants and small landowners. Whereas
tenants exhibit a constant ratio of indebtedness throughout the
life cycle, small landowners concentrate their debts in the
period when child-dependency is greatest. Table 12 shows another
important difference in the indebtedness patterns of tenants and
nontenants. Nontenants have a relatively balanced "portfolio" of
creditors, including banks, while tenants are highly dependent on
landlords for credit and have no transactions with banks whatsoever.
Table 12 also indicates that tenants borrow proportionatelymore
forconsumption purposes than nontenants.47
Thus, landlords seem to be financing the consumption
requirementsof their tenants' large families. Moreover, to the
extent that fertility is food-cost-elastic, landlords appear to
be creating an incentive for their tenants to have many children,
by cheapening the interest-cost of food. Finally, aside from
having many children and putting themtowork, their seeming
eneligibility to institutional credit presents a serious obstacle
totenants' accumulation of productive assets, other than children.
47Consumption loans in Table 12 cover food, medicine, general
household and travel.Food was the most frequent case.
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However,if tenants are credit-worthy enough to
repetitively merit so many loans from their landlords, their
lack of bank-credit becomes suspiciously sugestive of collusive
activity in the local credit market. Perhaps landlords derive
special advantages from the credit monopoly they enjoy vis--vis
their tenants. This advantage, however, need not be limited to
usurers' income from the interest rate charged. In stipulating
that the debt be paid in terms of the local cash—crop (cotton
in the case of Caicô and Monção, rice in the case of Monçäo), the
landlord-creditor is able to derive supplementary income by later
marketing the debt portion of the harvest (along with the
contractual share, in thecaseof landlords). Aside from preventing
debtrepayment in money, by monopolising the local labor market as
well, landlords inhibit rtney earning activities from diverting
householdlabor away from the cash crop.
In the long run, chronic consumer indebtedness
by tenant families provides their landlords with a growing.
and captive labor force, specialized in cash crop production.
Thesharing mechanism itself ensures landlords of
the future income flow to be derived from current financing of
tenant fertility. These conjectures are supported indirectly by
Tables 13 and 14 which show that tenants andtheirchildren are
more specialized in cash crop production thansmalllandowners
or squatters.
481nfact, landlords appear to excercise a four—fold monopoly
over their tenants: in theland market in the product market,
in the labor market and in the credit market.According to
KenethJ. Arrow in "Toward a Theory of Price Adjustment",
The Allocation of Economic Resources",Stanford University
Press, Palo Alto, pp 41—51, the greater the degree of
concentrationin any side of a market, the greater the
price—fixing power that side will have. Accordingly, the
high land prices and interest rates paid by small farmers
and the low wages and product prtces received by them are allsuggestive that landlords do indeed excercise the
monopoly power they posass in these markets.
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The other two components in the differential cost of
food between tenants and nontenants are its production and retail
cost,discussed briefly in section3 above.The production cost
rises quickly for small landowners, as their family size increases,
dueto diminishing returns on their ownxniniscule plots. Because
ofdiminishing returns, small landowners are forced to seek part-
time sharecropping, wage employment andotherincome earning
activities in order to support their families. As may be seen
inTables 13 and 14, thiS need is most pressing during the late
twenties and early thirties, when children are small. Tenants, on
the other hand, are sai4 to be sparedthe incidenceof diminishing
returnsdue to the practice whereby landlords allot land according
to family size. This is yet another way In which landlords may
be cheapening the food—cost of children for their tenants, in this
case its production—cost. For their part., by stimulating family
labor ontheirland, landlordswouldalso be ensuring themselves
of increasing utilization of their notoriously under utilized
properties in the land—abundant —labor-scarceNortheastern
agrarian economy.
Finally, the retail cost of food is also said to be
largely under the control of landlords, who alledgedly force ) tenantsto buy from the farm—store, thereby deriving retailincome
fromthe tenancy arrangement. This aspect cannot be analysed
within the present sample, since the origin of purchases was not
enquired. The sample does, however,provide some support concerning
landlordmonitoring of the production—cost of food for tenants,
via elastic supply of land to larger families.
Table 15, which shows acreage farmed by tenure class
andage group, provides some support, albeittenuous, for the
suppositionthat older (larger) tenant families receive more land
than younger tenants. Before 30 years,of age tenant plots are
smallar than those of small landowners and squatters, but become
much larger by the ages of 45 and over. These older tenant family-
heads sometimes command the agricultural labour of one or two sons
and four or five grandsons, all working their plots in the same
property and all living together in the same house. According to
Table '16, these are the highest income' households in the sample.
In fact, they may constitute the ideal which all others strive
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toattain. Abundance is generated by pooling the production of
many workers into one large consumption urtit,eventhough
individualconsumption levels may be low.
The attainment of the large successful tenant family
may be a deliberate objective,served by low food cosprovided by
landlords and high fertility behaviour practiced by tenants. It
does not seem to be anunintended outcome of unconscious social
practices,since Northeastern rural households belong to the saxte
cultural—ethnic blend of whites, blacks andindians.There does
not even seem to be any consistent difference in age of marriage
among tenure classes (Table 17) ,eventhough early marriage would
evidently serve the pro-natalist advantage of tenants andlate
marriage would serve the opposite interests of small landowners
andsquatters. Quite thecontrary, the large tenant farni ly
appearsto be a goal that is set uponearly in life, toward
whichparents work by moving less than other rural households
(Table 18), establishing permanent ties of social and economic
dependence upon their landlords, having as many children as
possibleandworkingthemasmuch as they can.49
Conclusions
Northeastern share—tenancy is an institutional arrangement which
regulates a specific set: of transactions between tenants and
landlords. Landless peasantsgain access to land and food-
storage services during destitute periods. Landlords gain access
tofamily labor from the overlapping life cycles of individual
members. Intrinsic to this relationship is food—consumption-cum-
crop-lien indebtedness. Its short-run effect is to provide an
incentive toward increasing householdlabor effort and specialization
in the cash crop. Its long—run impact apparently stimulates
increasingfamily size: both by boosting the benefitsof larger
familiesand by reducing their cost. Thus, share—tenancy seems
hadexpected that tenant children would also put in fewer
hours in school than those of small landowners andsquatters.
But the very spottyevidencecollected in the sample
(Table 19) does not lend support tothis supposition.
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tobe linked to high fertility.50
This is a very new hypothesis and merits further
investigation. In subsequent papers, the food-cost and labor-
benefits of children in a tenant-landlord economy will be contrasted
with those of a wage-labor agrarian economy. These elements will be
incorporated into a fertility model, which will be tested on the
rural portion of the nationwide household survey collected by the
Estudo Nacional da Despesa Familiar (ENDEF—FIBGE).
In Brazil, rural fertility rates have declined significantly
during the past decade. Meanwhile, the recent and rapid transformation
of share—tenants into a wage labor force has coincided with
increasing under—e'irloyment and labor —surplusconditions in the
urban economy. Since worstening urban employment prospects
progressively dampen the migratory threat, new commercial farm-
enterprizes may no longer feel the need to boost the reproduction
of the rural labor force or to tie workers to the land, as
slaveowners used to do by force and as traitiorial landlords
still do by indebtedness. The empirical evidence presented In this
paper suggests that the decline in rural fertility in Brazil, may
signify not a "modernization" of the rural labor force, but its
conscious adjustment to the loss of fertility inducements experienced
previously under tenancy.
D
50Asidefromcrop— lienindebtedness sharecropper speci ali zation in cash—crop production wasalso acommon and much maligned
phenomenon in the post-bellum South ofthe United States. A morerecent and very interesting finding fromthe point of view of this paper is thatnon—landowning rural blacks also seem to have had larg families than smalllandowners. In thisregard, see S.Parnell, "The Effect of Emancipation on theFertility of Black Americans", paper,Economicsl3o,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MOTHER'S AGE 15-1920-2425-2930-34 35-3940-4445-49
Total .51 2.73 4.97 6.63 7.83 8.66 9.19
Caic6 .34 2'.84 4.35 6.37 7.95 8.45 8.62
F1ornja .67 3.45 6.38 8.10 9.4711.1412.22
Monço .55 2.09 3.81 5.25 6.05 6:75 6.99
Tenants1 .63 2.78 5.92 7.73 8.8810.01 10.94
Caic6 .42 2.08 3.93 6.63 8.39 9.72 9.72
F1ornia .75 3.63 7.34 9.0410.00 11.80 12.80
Monço
Small Land Owners .38 2.47 2.98 5.43 7.17 7.54 7.86
Caic6 .13 .33 1.71 4.23 5.98 6.28 6.50
F1ornia .00 .67 2.00 3.67 5.55 6.55 6.55
Monço .61 1.85 3.66 5.94 6.87 7.24 7.77
Others .58 3.14 4.96 5.36 6.25 7.05 4.44
Caic62 .62 6.50 7.68 9.1310.4311.1011.27
F1ot-nja2 .60 5.60 8.9310.60 11.60 13.40 14.57













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 NUMBER OF RESIDENT CHILDREN*
MOThER'S AGE 15-1920-2425—2930—3435—3940—4445—49 3 50
Total 3.0 2.3 3.6 5.0 5.3 5.86.9 6.5
Caic6 2.5 2.0 2.6 4.7 .0 11.0 5.8
Florinia 3.3 3.1 5.4 4.2 9.5 6.0 9.0
Monço 3.0 1.4 4.4 6.1 6.5 5.76.9 6.7
Tenants1 2.0 3.0 3.7 4.6 5.0 5.7 8.2
Caic6 .8 3.5 2.0 3.0 .0 9.0
Flornia 3.2 2.8 5.4 5.7 10.0 5 7 8.0
Monço
SmailLandOwners 6.0 5.0 .3.2 4.3 4.4 1.010.] 5.2
Caic 5.0 .5 3.5 6.0 11.0 4.7
Flotinia 2.0 9.0
Monço 6.0 4.5 6.0 6.0 1.010.5 5.5
Others 1.5 2.3 4.5 6.0 6.2 6.4 5.7 6.5
Caic2 4.5 4.0 5.3 4.9
Flornia2 4.0 5.0 9.0 7.0 .2





"Residentchildren" may belong to a previous marriage of either spouse. They are
not necessarily the offspring of the mother who was interviewed.TABLE 6
*
AVERAGENUMBEROFWORKING MEMBERSPER HOUSEHOLD
MOTHER'S AGE 20-2425-2930—3435—3940-4445—49 50
**
Total 4.0 3.9 3.8 4.3 3.7 5.0 5.3
Caic 3.9 4.8 3.6 4.0 2.0 4.0 5.0
Flornia 4.2 2:1 4.2 5.0 7.0 7.0 5.8
Monço - - - - - -
Tenants1 3.7 2.4 3.7 5.6 5.5 7.0 6.0
Caic6 2.8 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.0 - 6.6
Florinia 4.6 1.8 4.2 7.3 9.0 7.0 5.7
lloncao - - - - -
SmailLand Owners 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.6 4.0 3.9
Caic6 4.0 4.0 4.0 6.0 4.0 4.2
Flornia
— - - 4.0 3.0
—***
Monçao
Others .- - - -
Caic62 6.5 5.0 4.0 4.7
flornia2 2.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 9.0
Monçao - - - -
1Sharecroppers+ Sharetenants
2Part-timeSharecroppers or Sharetenants
*Includesall"domestic"andnon market work recorded.
** —
Caicoand Florania only.
This information was not collected in Monçao.TABLE 7
*
AVERAGE_YEARLY HOURS PER WORKER
MOTHER'S AGE 20-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-49 50
Total 2.6 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.8 2.2
CaicE 2.7 1.2 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.9 1.8
Flornia 2.3 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.5 3.1
- **
Monçao - - --- -
Tenants1 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.0 2.0 2.3 3.2
Caic 2.3 1.3 2.4 1.1 2.2
— 2.7
Flornia 2.2 3.7 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.3 3.7
**
Monco
- - - -
SmallLandOwners 4.4 1.8 2.8 2.0 2..9 2.1
Caic 4.4 1.8 2.8 2.2 2.9 1.9




Others 3.0 2.1 2.3 3.0 3.9 3 1 2.3
Caic62 2.6 - 2.3 3.0 2.5
F1ornia2 3.9 2.1 3;9 3.1 2.2
3 **
Monçao - - - -
1Sharecroppers÷ Share tenants
2Part-time Sharecroppers or Sharetenants
3Squatters
*
In1 000 hs per year.
NB: 10 hs per day x 6 days per week x 52 weeks per year =3120 hpy.
**
Thisinformation was not collected in Monço.TABLE 10
PENSIONS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS, INCLUDING GIFTS,
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME
(%)
MOTHER'S AGE 20-2425-2930-3435-3940-44 45—49 50
Total 6.9 1.2 3.7 2.7 5.7 5.7 11.4
Caic6 lS2 .7 6.4 5.4 55.7 .0 14.3
Flornia .7 2.7 1.9 1.7 1.9 10.6 309
Monco
2.6 .4 2.1 .9 3.9 1.2 6.0
Tenants 3.3 2.2 11.6 2.4 15.7 5.0 8.4
Caic6 6.5 1.2 0.5 3.855.7 8.8
Flornia .1 2.6 1.9 1.7 3.4 5.0 2.7
Monço
SmaliLandOwners 2.5 .0 2.9 4.6 2.6 2.3 17.3
Caic6 2.5 .0 .0 15.4 .0 19.3
F1ornia
— 1.9 14.0
Monço .0 13.2 1.2 2.6 3.6 5.8
Others 9.7 0.7 6.8 2.0 3.3 7.0 9.9
Caicó2 30.0 33.6 3.9 14.9
F1ornia2 .0 3.3 .0 22.1 7.0
Monço3 2.7 0.5 1.6 .8 3.9 6.2 .6
1Sharecroppers + Sharetenants
2Part-Time Sharecroppers or Sharetenants
SquattersTABLE 11




2Part-Time Sharecroppers or Sharetenants
Squatters
MOTHER'S AGE 20-2425-2930-3435-3940-44 I 50
Total .09 .15 .15 .15 .19 .14 .24
Caic .0? .08 .05 .12 - - .04
rlornia .15 .16 .22 .21 .21 .14 .35
Monco .06 .14 .15 .07 .15 .14 .30
Tenants1 .15 .17 .14 .18 .12 .20 .17
Caic6 .07 .12 .08 .07 .00 - .O
F1ornia .18 .20 .19 .25 .15 .20 .27
Moncäo - - - - - - -
Small Land Owners .00 .23 .24 .08 .00 .00 .20

































F1ornia2 .00 .00- - .27 .00 .56
Moriço3
—






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NON-CASH-CROP INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
HOUSEHOLD INCOME
MOTHER'S AGE 20-2425-2930-3435-3940—4445-49 50
Total 63 76 74 66 83 68 66
Caic6 77 69 69 42 84 96 71
F1ornia 10 57 54 42 60 38 19
Monço 97 92 90 87 91 96 76
Tenants1 30 54 58 39 81 37 47
Caic6 55 55 60 46 84 - 59
F1ornia 13 53 54 41 80 37 15
Monço - - - - - - -
Small LandOwners 88 96 87 60 94 97 88
Caic6 88 95 89 67 - 96 89
F1ornia - — - 46 - - 49
Monço - 98 80 78 94 98 22
Others 81. 90 90 69 83 79 73
Ca1c52 96 - 88 58 - - 6
F1ornia2 6 95 - — 35 42 44




Part-Time Sharecroppers or Sharetenants
SquattersTABLE 14





Total 60 65 60 45 44 81 54
Caicó 68 66 68 44 43 98 59
Fio,inia 46 63 45 48 48 47 44
Monco*
- — — -
Tenants1 50 58 57 38 49 46 55
Caic6 56 53 68 29 43 - 68




Caic6 94 71 65 40 98 54




Others 64 100 73 56 42 51 51
Caic2 66 - 73 56 - - 54
'F1orinia2 56 100 — - 42 51 37
—3*




Part-Time Sharecroppers or Sharetenants
Squatters
*
Informationnot collected in MonçoTABLE 15
ACREAGE FARMED
MOTHER'S AGE 20-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-49 50
Total 9.23 4.3 4.9 3.7 3.5 5.9 7.7
Caic6 2.1 - 4.0 3.4 1.2 0.3 9.7
Floränia 6.6 - 5.2 5.5 6.6 8.3 8.2
Monço 20.2 5.1 5.2 3.0 3.2 5.4 4.1
Tenants1 2.6 3.8 4.8 6.6 2.4 8.715.3
Caic 1.7 4.0 4.4 5.1 1.2 — 18.4
Flornia 3.6 3.7 5.2 7.7 3.6 8.7 12.3
Monçäo
Small LandOwners 4.0 4.3 2.0 2.7 1.2 3.2 5.4
Caic6 4.0 5.0 1.7 1.0 -0.36.45
Flornia — 2.2
Monço - 4.0 2.4 3.9 1.2 4.72.0
Others 18.1 4.8 5.5 2.8 3.8 5.9 4.6
Caic62 2.0 — 6.6 3.0 - - 6.1
Florinia2 22.0 0.6 - - 9.6 7.0 2.0




Part-Time Sharecroppers or Sharetenants
SquattersTABLE 16
TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME*

















Flornia 7.3 5.3 6.4 5.9 12.0 8.6 6.0
Monço 6.4 4.4 3.5 3.2 4.4 4.7 3.8
Tenants1 5.1 6.1 6.9 6.4 8.6 7.7 9.4
Caicä 4.3 7.6 7.4 5.5 4.1 - 10.7
Florinia 5.9 5.6 6.4 7.1 13.2 7.7 8.0
Monço - - — — - - -
SmalilandOwners 10.942 2.9 3.7 1.9 3.3 5.1
Caic6 10.9 4.2 3.3 3.9 - 3.5 5.7
Florir.ia — - — 4.4 - - 1.5
Monço




































Cr$ 1 000 of 1974 — US$ 166TABLE 17
AGE OF MARRIAGE OF MOTHERS
MOTHER'S AGE 15-1920-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-49 >50
Total 16.318.512.618.521.221.223.625.4
Caic - 21.521.523.722.3 nm 21.026.8
F1ornia - 17.3 17.3 18.0 17.8 18.0 .18.7 21.2
Monço 16.3 18.318.3 17.822.2 27.1- 25.0 23.1
Tenants1 — 18.7 17.721.3 20.0 28.0 19.0 23.3
Caic6 - 19.8 24.025.5 nm - 23.6
F1ornia — 17.6 17.3 18.0 16.3 16.1 19.0 23.3
Moncäo - - - - - - - 23.0
Small LandOwners 15.0 na 20.0 na 19.8 28.0 18.7 24.8
Caic - na 24.0 na 17.0- 21.0 24.9
Flornia — — - - 20.0- - 20.0










































HOURS OF SCHOOL PER YEAR PER CHILD










Caic6 0 0 174.55 0 0 136.00
Flornia 0 0 29.23230.00112.0080.00167.50
Monço - - - - - -
Small Land Owners*
Caic6 0 0 0 180.00- 128.00 59.17
Florir.ia - - 0
Monço 118.29 0 221.54 0 221.40 0
*
Others —



















2Part-time Sharecroppers or Sharetenants
3Squatters
*
Totalswere not calculated due to a systematic nature f response.TABLE 18
PERCENTAGE OF HUSBANDS WHO HAVE EVER LIVEDINANOTHER STATE



















F1ornia - 50 42.9 80 60 0 50 60
Monço 66.7 57.1 41.7 46.7 25 28.6 57.1 25
Tenants1 — 40 37.5 50 60 0 33.3 22.2
Caicó - 20 50 20 50 0 - 20
Flornia — 60 33.3 80 65.7 0 33.3 33.3
t1onço
— - - — . — — 0
Small Land 0'iners 100 100 33.3 33.3 40 100 100 53.3
Caic5 - 100 0 0 0 - 100 33.3
Floijnia — • — — 50 - — 100
Monço 100 - 50 100 50 100 100 0
Others 50 40 44.4 40 33.3 21.4 50 35.3
Caicö2
F1ornia2
Monço3
—
-
50
0
0
57.1
—
100
37.5
0
-
42.9
66.7
-
16.7
—
0
23.1
-
100
40
28.6
100
33.3
1Sharecroppers +Sharetenants
2Part-time Sharecroppersor Sharetenants
3Squatters